Taking literally the concept of emotional truth requires breaking the monopoly on truth of belief-like states. To this end, I look to perceptions for a model of non-propositional states that might be true or false, and to desires for a model of propositional attitudes the norm of which is other than the semantic satisfaction of their propositional object. Those models inspire a conception of generic truth, which can admit of degrees for analogue representations such as emotions; belief-like states, by contrast, (...) are digital representations. I argue that the gravest problem-objectivity-is not insurmountable. /// [Adam Morton] It is accuracy rather than truth itself that is valuable. Emotional truth is a dubious though attractive notion, but emotional accuracy is much easier to make sense of. My approach to accuracy goes via an account of what makes a story accurate. Stories can be accurate but not true, and emotions can be accurate whether or not they are true. The capacity for emotional accuracy, for emotions that fit a person's situation, is an aspect of emotional intelligence, which is as important an aspect of rational human agency as the intelligent formation of beliefs and desires. (shrink)

In this urbane and witty book, Ronald de Sousa disputes the widespread notion that reason and emotion are natural antagonists.

O presente trabalho pretende resgatar o debate entre Richard Rorty e Nancy Fraser, ocorrido no início da década de 1990, especificamente a partir do texto Feminismo e Pragmatismo apresentado na Tanner Lectures on Human Value. Nesta conferência o filósofo discorreu sobre a possibilidade de conciliação entre o seu pragmatismo e o feminismo. Rorty aborda o feminismo enquanto autocriação da mulher através da “redescrição” mediante a manifestação poética, onde o filósofo encara as feministas como criadoras do novo. Em seguida, exporemos a (...) crítica de Fraser, que trabalha sobre a proposta apresentada pelo pragmatista e que oferece suas próprias ideias dentro de uma concepção do feminismo como movimento democrático de massa. Ao final, uma breve avaliação das implicações das críticas e sugestões apresentadas por Rorty ao feminismo e também da resposta de Fraser. (shrink)

Emotions are Janus‐faced. They tell us something about the world, and they tell us something about ourselves. This suggests that we might speak of a truth, or perhaps two kinds of truths of emotions, one of which is about self and the other about conditions in the world. On some views, the latter comes by means of the former. Insofar as emotions manifest our inner life, however, we are more inclined to speak of authenticity rather than truth. What is the (...) difference? We need to distinguish the criteria of correspondence or appropriateness suitable for authenticity from those that embody the criterion of truth. Furthermore there is also a question about the transitions – among states of mind, and between states of mind and behaviour – that emotions encourage. This realm of transitions concerns rationality. After sketching the relevant distinctions, I will endeavour to justify the view that emotions should be appraised in terms of all three terms. (shrink)

Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on taking a moderate position both on the question (...) of the naturalness of emotions and on that of their objectivity as revealers of value: emotions are neither simply natural nor socially constructed, and they apprehend objective values, but those values are multidimensional and relative to human realities. The axiological position I defend jettisons the usual foundations for ethical judgments, and grounds these judgments instead on a rationally informed reflective equilibrium of comprehensive emotional attitudes, tempered with a dose of irony. (shrink)

The word "truth" retains, in common use, traces of origins that link it to trust, truth, and truce, connoting ideas of fidelity, loyalty, and authenticity. The word has become, in contemporary philosophy, encased in a web of technicalities, but we know that a true image is a faithful portrait; a true friend a loyal one. In a novel or a poem, too, we have a feel for what is emotionally true, though we are not concerned with the actuality of events (...) and characters depicted. To have emotions is to care about certain things: we can wonder whether those things are really worth caring about. We can wonder whether our passions reflect who we are, and whether they constitute fitting responses to the vicissitudes of life. So there are two aspects to emotional truth: how well an emotion reflects the threats and promises of the world, and how well it reflects our own individual nature. That is the starting point of this book, which looks first at the analogies and disanalogies between strict propositional truth and a looser, "generic" sense of truth. As applied to emotions, generic truth is closer to those original meanings: as in a portrait's fidelity or friend's loyalty. Taken in this sense, the notion of emotional truth opens up large vistas on areas of life essential to our existence as social beings, and to our concerns with beauty, morality, love, death, sex, knowledge, desire, coherence, and happiness. Each of those topics illustrates some facet of the dominant theme of the book: the crucial but often ambivalent role of our emotions in grounding and yet also sometimes undermining our values. Emotions act, in holistic perspective, as ultimate arbiters of values where different and independently justified standards of value compete. (shrink)

Introduction -- Function and destiny -- What's the good of thinking? -- Rationality, individual and collective -- Irrationality.

How should we understand the emotional rationality? This first part will explore two models of cognition and analogy strategies, test their intuition about the emotional desire. I distinguish between subjective and objective desire, then presents with a feeling from the "paradigm of drama" export semantics, here our emotional repertoire is acquired all the learned, and our emotions in the form of an object is fixed. It is pretty well in line with the general principles of rationality, especially the lowest reasonable (...) principles. Turned to the second part of this side of reasonable. I will inquire how emotional beliefs, desires, and behaviors contribute to the rationality. I will present a very general biological hypothesis: emotions by controlling highlights the characteristics of perception and reasoning, so that we remove the difficulties due in particular to lead to paralysis; they are being simulated by a simplified perception of information, thus limiting our practice and cognitive choice. How are we to understand emotional or axiological rationality? I pursue analogies with both the cognitive and the strategic models, testing them against intuitions about emotional desires. We distinguish two different classes of desires, the subjective and the objective, and propose that emotions have a semantics that derives from "paradigmatic scenarios", in terms of which our emotional repertoire is learned and the formal objects of our emotions fixed. This fits in well with emerging facts about how our emotional capacities develop, and it can also be squared with the general principles of rationality, particularly minimal rationality. In the second part, I return to the perspective of rationality. I ask how emotions contribute to the rationality of beliefs, desires, and behavior. I proffer a very general biological hypothesis: Emotions spare us the paralysis potentially induced by a particular predicament by controlling the salience of features of perception and reasoning; they temporarily mimic the informational encapsulation of perception and so circumscribe our practical and cognitive options. (shrink)

Do we love someone for their virtue, their beauty, or their moral or other qualities? Are love's characteristic desires altruistic or selfish? Are there duties of love? What do the sciences tell us about love? In this Very Short Introduction, Ronald de Sousa explores the different kinds of love, from affections to romantic love.

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 4, Page 257-261, October 2022. Müller argues that the perceptual or “Axiological Receptivity” model of emotions is incoherent, because it requires an emotion to apprehend and respond to its formal object at the same time. He defends a contrasting view of emotions as “Position-Takings" towards “formal objects”, aspects of an emotion's target pertinent to the subject's concerns. I first cast doubt on the cogency of Müller's attack on AR as begging questions about the temporal characteristics (...) of perceptual events. I then argue that Müller's version of PT is not radical enough. On my attitudinal view, formal objects are not values but natural properties that justify specific affective or behavioral responses. Values are constituted only by a negotiated social aggregation of individual evaluative attitudes. (shrink)

The movement of Artificial Intelligence (AI) research from universities to big corporations has had a significant impact on the development of the field. In the past, AI research was primarily conducted in academic institutions, which foster a culture of peer reviewing and collaboration to enhance quality improvements. The growing interest in AI among corporations, especially regarding Machine Learning (ML) technology, has shifted the focus of research from quality to quantity. Corporations have the resources to invest in large-scale ML projects and (...) they are often more interested in fast results than in ensuring that AI algorithms are reliable and safe. This paper proposes that the description of a Darwinian process made by the mathematician and physicist Freeman Dyson can be used to understand the implications of ML research scenario. The context of the Darwinian process—or lack thereof—can be used to draw a parallel between historical and current implications of technology expansion strongly driven by economic interests, making clear the consequences of shifting AI research from academia to industry. Finally, this paper indicates future directions for AI research to create a healthier environment for the evolution of ML technology. (shrink)

Os registros históricos humanos sofreram transformações à medida em que evoluíam as tecnologias. Quanto maior a evolução tecnológica, mais informações puderam ser disseminadas. O objetivo desta pesquisa é discutir as possíveis similaridades entre a Ciência da Informação e as nuances pós-modernas. Como procedimentos metodológicos apresenta uma pesquisa de natureza qualitativa e exploratória baseada em uma revisão bibliográfica. O estudo possibilitou a confirmação dos elementos relacionais para uma compreensão dialógica entre a pós-modernidade, a complexidade e a Ciência da Informação. O pensamento (...) pós-moderno questiona paradigmas consolidados na Ciência Moderna, contrapondo-se às ideias e práticas inerentes ao pensamento científico baseado no paradigma dominante, mais especificamente nos preceitos provenientes do racionalismo científico, da visão reducionista e da discrepante realidade de grupos sociais. (shrink)

O artigo trata de uma revisão sistemática de literatura, com o objetivo de analisar os estudos existentes sobre o cuidado institucional ao professor universitário e o cuidado praticado pelo professor nas suas ações educativas. Foi feito um levantamento de artigos e teses no portal de periódicos da CAPES, publicados no período de 2010 a 2023, com os seguintes termos de busca: cuidado, educação, ensino superior, professor universitário, qualidade de vida, trabalho, saúde mental, saúde docente, bem-estar docente, acolhimento e promoção de (...) saúde. Foram incluídos estudos sobre o cuidado ao docente no ensino superior e as suas ações do cuidar nas práticas da área de Humanas. A análise embasou-se na Psicologia Histórico-Cultural articulada por Vygotsky, realizando a leitura na íntegra dos nove estudos incluídos, sendo sete artigos e duas teses, organizados em duas categorias: cuidado institucional ao professor universitário e o cuidado exercido pelo docente universitário na sua prática profissional. Os resultados mostram que o cuidado ao docente universitário tem sido vivenciado por ações pontuais sobre qualidade de vida no trabalho. Foi percebida a carência de estudos que identifiquem questões implicadas no cuidado ao docente de caráter institucional e que apresentam as práticas educativas no ensino superior como ato de cuidado. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that, despite the progress made in recent years, virtue argumentation theory still lacks a more systematic acknowledgment of other-regarding virtues. A fuller recognition of such virtues not only enriches the field of research of virtue argumentation theory in significant ways, but also allows for a richer and more intuitive view of the virtuous arguer. A fully virtuous arguer, it is argued, should care to develop both self-regarding and other-regarding virtues. He should be concerned both with (...) his own development as an arguer and with helping other arguers in that regard. (shrink)

O artigo em questão trata de um tema importante dentro da filosofia política moderna e no pensamento do filósofo inglês John Locke: a propriedade. Discute-se a forma com a qual Locke conceituou a propriedade em seu livro mais famoso, intitulado “Dois Tratados Sobre o Governo”. No entanto, plausível será a caracterização de época histórica em que seu pensamento emerge. O autor destaca a propriedade como um conceito correspondente à moderna sociedade capitalista, entendida como “posse” no sentido mais amplo. Por finalmente, (...) a partir de uma leitura crítica, referenciada por comentadores, faz-se alguns apontamentos das implicações e ressonâncias posteriores na contemporaneidade. (shrink)

À quoi bon la pensée? Pour de nombreux chercheurs, inspirés par les théories évolutionnistes, la pensée réfléchie est utile à notre espèce. Elle lui confère des avantages importants et contribue à son succès reproductif. Pourtant ses avantages ne sont pas si évidents. La pensée ne figure ni dans les mécanismes de l'évolution qui ont façonné la vie, ni parmi les procédés dont se servent la plupart des organismes pour s'y maintenir. Dans Évolution et rationalité, Ronald de Sousa montre que, (...) pour comprendre les avantages de la pensée réfléchie, il faut changer nos présupposés relatifs à la rationalité et reconnaître la multiplicité de ses dimensions. La rationalité ne nous sert pas seulement à avoir des croyances vraies et à agir de manière efficace dans un environnement changeant. Elle nous aide à gérer nos plaisirs et nos peines dans le temps et nous permet d'envisager des situations qui n'existent pas. En général, le statut de la rationalité comme ensemble de capacités ayant évolué dans le cours de l'histoire naturelle de notre espèce, passant des tropismes aux désirs et de la détection à la représentation, n'a pas été pris suffisamment au sérieux. Suivre ce processus d'évolution de la rationalité permet de comprendre comment elle est devenue une norme, mais aussi pourquoi il lui arrive aussi souvent d'échouer. Ronald de Sousa a profondément modifié nos façons de concevoir les émotions. Avec Évolution et rationalité, il pourrait avoir une influence aussi décisive sur nos façons de concevoir la rationalité. (shrink)

Mangan draws his inspiration from James's account of fringe consciousness, but differs from James in focusing on something non-sensory, necessarily fuzzy, though not necessarily fleeting. A long tradition in philosophy has deemed non-sensory elements of consciousness to be indispensable to thought. But those, chiefly conceptual, forms of non-sensory fringe are not Mangan's focus. What then is Mangan talking about? This commentary envisages a number of possible answers, and tentatively concludes that fringe consciousness is essentially emotional. Emotional consciousness involves proprioception, however, (...) hence is non-sensory only in the weak sense of excluding the five senses. (shrink)

Femininity and whiteness dominate Western nursing, silencing ontologies and epistemologies that do not align with these dominant norms while perpetuating systemic racism and discrimination in nursing practice, education, research, nursing activism, and sociopolitical structures. We propose Black feminist thought as a praxis to decenter, deconstruct, and unseat these ideologies and systems of power. Drawing from the work of past and present Black feminist scholars, we examine the ontological and epistemological perspectives of Black feminist thought. These include (i) the uniqueness and (...) particular experiences of people, (ii) the acceptance of ontological and epistemological pluralism of truths and ways of knowing, and (iii) the mandate for equity in the health, social, political, and environmental structures of society. By focusing our attention on lived experiences and voices of those systematically excluded in nursing practice, education, research, and society, Black feminist thought offers an anticolonial, antiracist, and antidiscriminatory foundation for more effectively upholding nursing's disciplinary mandate for social justice and equity. (shrink)

Al god og al fuldkommen Gave er ovenfra.

In this essay, I will focus on the two main objections that have been adduced against the moral acceptability of contempt: the fact that it embraces a whole person and not merely some deed or aspect of a person’s character, and the way that when addressed to a person in this way, it amounts to a denial of the very personhood of its target.

This study aims to examine the ethical decision-making model proposed by Schwartz, where we consider the factors of non-rationality and aspects that affect ethical judgments of auditors to make the decision to blow the whistle. In this paper, we argue that the intention of whistleblowing depends on ethical awareness and ethical judgment as well as there is a mediation–moderation due to emotion and perceived moral intensity of auditors. Data were collected using an online survey with 162 external auditors who worked (...) on audit firms in Indonesia as well as 173 internal auditors working in the manufacturing and financial services. The result of multigroup analysis shows that emotion can mediate the relationship between EAW and EJW. The nature of this relationship is more complex and then tested by adding moderating variables using consistent partial least squares approach. We found that EMT and PMI can improve the relationship between ethical judgments and whistleblowing intentions. These findings indicate that internal auditors are more likely to blow the whistle than external auditors; and reporting wrongdoing internally and anonymously are the preferred way of professional accountants to blow the whistle in Indonesia. (shrink)

A ADVOCACIA DE COMPLIANCE COMO FORMA DE PREVENÇÃO À LAVAGEM DE DINHEIRO.

Even though the university has the potential to help humanity in what amounts to a paradigmatic transition, it has been very restrictive and very selective in the kinds of knowledges it validates. In fact, the kinds of knowledges in which it has excelled are those most responsible for the paradigmatic crisis in which humanity finds itself. In a nutshell, the paradigmatic change calls for cognitive justice, justice for the different ways of knowing that circulate in society. Cognitive justice is the (...) polar opposite of ‘anything goes’. The assumption is that there is no global social justice without global cognitive justice, justice among knowledges. Looking back, while privileging one specific kind of knowledge and, indeed, granting it a cognitive monopoly, the university has been the privileged site for producing and legitimating cognitive injustice. As a result, the immense epistemic diversity of the world has been ignored or suppressed. In the following, I identify the problem and the promise for overcoming it. (shrink)

O presente artigo intenta perquirir o pensamento do abade e místico medieval Joaquim de Fiore (1132-1202), no que tange a concepção escatológica. O abade cisterciense e filósofo místico, defensor do milenarismo e do advento da idade do Espírito Santo deu origem a diversos movimentos filosóficos, com destaque para os joaquimitas. Seu pensamento foi combatido por Tomás de Aquino e condenado pelo Concílio de Laterão de 1215. Partindo de uma releitura dos escritos de Joaquim de Fiore (Liber Concordiae Novi ac Veteris (...) Testamenti, Expositio in Apocalipsim e Psalterium Decem Chordarum) buscar-se-á ponderar o contributo de seu pensamento, a teologia como história trinitário-escatológica. O abade calabrês sente-se autorizado a superar o absolutismo crístico, favorecendo uma concepção mais trinitária da história com acentos escatológicos e apocalípticos. Por fim, o artigo busca contribuir positivamente no retorno aos escritos joaquinistas que muito podem contribuir para a teologia como história humano-Trintária. (shrink)

En este artículo nos proponemos analizar las relaciones entre exilio, lengua y territorio en una lectura de poemas seleccionados de los libros Vicio de Miami (1997) y Confesiones del estrangulador de Flagler Street (1998), de Néstor Díaz de Villegas (Cienfuegos, Cuba, 1956). El eje propuesto pretende comprender, por un lado, algunos aspectos de su poética, como aparece en sus primeros libros publicados; por otro, ponerla en perspectiva respecto a la condición del exilio cubano en los Estados Unidos en la época (...) de la crisis de Mariel (1980), especialmente desde sus repercusiones en el campo de la cultura. (shrink)

The question What is an individual? goes back beyond Aristotle’s discussion of substance to the Ionians’ preoccupation with the paradox of change -- the fact that if anything changes it must stay the same. Mere reflection on this fact and the common-sense notion of a countable thing yields a concept of a “minimal individual”, which is particular (a logical matter) specific (a taxonomic matter), and unique (an evaluative empirical matter). Individuals occupy space, and therefore might be dislodged. Even minimal individuals, (...) therefore (Strawsonian individual or Aristotelian substance) already contain the potential for competition or conflict. What is added by biology to this basic notion? It emerges from some recent work on the evolution of metazoan animals that individuals as we know them are minimal individuals towhich four features have been added, and which appear to be inseparable: differentiated multicellularity; sexual reproduction; segregation of germ from somatic cells; and obligatory death. Whether or not individuals are to be counted as units of selection, they are not the beneficiaries of natural selection. (shrink)

A pandemia da COVID-19 causou uma completa modificação nas formas de interação e comportamento social, visto que a contenção do vírus tornou-se prioridade mundial. O Estado, junto à medicina, passou a determinar os protocolos sanitários seguidos pela comunidade. A partir da indagação do filósofo Giorgio Agamben acerca da facilidade na qual uma sociedade permitiu considerar-se contagiada e entendendo como um período de calamidade deflagra a fragilidade da racionalidade científica diante da demanda por cura, neste artigo objetivou-se analisar se a medicina (...) tem respondido às demandas místicas a ela solicitadas, ou mesmo, se tem forjado demandas mistificadoras que reforçam seu lugar de poder social. Para tal, notas e documentos e posicionamentos de figuras políticas e instituições médicas brasileiras estarão aqui postos em pauta como vitrine que permite a análise da presença do caráter místico no discurso da medicina. É trazida aqui a oportunidade de ponderar as consequências decorrentes da ausência de questionamento acerca da cientificidade das instituições médicas e de suas influências na sociedade contemporânea. A exploração abrange não apenas o funcionamento baseado em conhecimento, mas também ressalta a influência da fé. Portanto, é um convite à reflexão sobre como a prática médica nos convida ao apego da crença na ciência. (shrink)

Neste artigo, pretendo oferecer algumas razões para se dizer que Aristóteles sustenta a tese de que a εὐδαιμονία não apenas oferece o critério normativo que orienta a instituição e a reforma de regimes que estão aquém do melhor regime, como também é aquilo que é visado pela instituição e pela reforma destes regimes, pois o melhor regime não é, para Aristóteles, senão o regime no qual a εὐδαιμονία pode ser alcançada em máximo grau (cf. Pol. VII.13 1332a4-7).

In this paper I explain the impact of phenomenological philosophy in the conceptions of Luís Cabral de Mancada about law and juridical experience. Stressing that Moncada was the first scholar in Portugal who made an extensive use of phenomenological doctrines within his own field of research, I show that Husserl, Hartmann, and Scheler were the most influential thinkers for him. As a matter of fact, they had a positive impact on Moncada’s conceptions about Law, the axiological realm, the State, and (...) jusnaturalism. (shrink)

Em 1869, em uma recomendação de livros de interesse para o público espírita, Allan Kardec escreveu que a “filosofia moral” do pastor americano William Ellery Channing era “o mais puro espiritismo”. Este artigo parte desse fato para efetuar uma análise das similaridades entre o pensamento de Kardec e o chamado cristianismo liberal (ou unitarismo) dos Estados Unidos, do qual Channing era o mais famoso representante na primeira metade do século XIX. Para isso, efetua-se, primeiro, uma definição do termo “cristianismo liberal”; (...) em seguida, traçam-se algumas de suas raízes intelectuais no pensamento cristão anglo-americano e, finalmente, comparam-se alguns elementos de sua versão do cristianismo com a leitura kardequiana dessa tradição religiosa por meio, principalmente, de um texto representativo de cada autor quanto a esse assunto, a saber: _Unitarian Christianity_, de 1819, e _O Evangelho segundo o Espiritismo_ (na versão definitiva de 1866). Ao fim, constata-se que algumas das teses e abordagens propostas por Kardec já circulavam há décadas no meio protestante americano, não se restringindo apenas à “filosofia moral”. (shrink)

The Philosophical search for Natural Kinds is motivated by the hope of finding ontological categories that are independent of our interests. Other requirements, of varying importance, are commonly made of kinds that claim to be natural. But no such categories are to be found. Virtually any kind can be termed ‘natural’ relative to some set of interests and epistemic priorities. Science determines those priorities at any particular stage of its progress, and what kinds are most ‘natural’ in that sense is (...) always a real and lively scientific question. The general philosophical problem of scientific realism is also real; but between the scientific and the metaphysical, the ‘Problem of Natural Kinds’ sits otiose. (shrink)